Friday, March 12, 2004
DID AL REYES ON SEPTEMBER 25, 1999 CHANGE EVERYTHING?
The reports indicated that the Red Sox and Nomar have had varying opinions on his “market value” during these changing economic times in baseball. It should no longer be much of an issue with the acquisition of A-Hole and the signing of Tejada. Baseball “market value” is based primarily on historical performance for a number of reasons. With that in mind, Nomar’s “market value” is above Tejada’s roughly $12 million salary and A-Hole’s salary paid by the MFY at $16 million. Both Nomar and the Sox appear to not have issue with the length of the proposal (three years), so a contract around $42 million should be considered “market value.” The issues are will Nomar’s future performance mirror his historical production and are better alternatives available.
Beside that fact that Nomar was an all-world hitter prior to his wrist injury, the only good comparables (shortstops in the modern era), in terms of getting a gauge for future performance is HOF, Ernie Banks. One player is too small of a sample size to draw any type of conclusions about Nomar’s future performance (I will mention that Banks did not put up an OPS+ greater than 120 after the age of 30) so a hard look at his past performance in relation to a larger sample is the best way to measure Nomar’s future value.
A hitter’s value is mostly measured by his ability to contribute to putting runs on the scoreboard by getting on-base/scoring runs and hitting for power/driving in runs. A player’s OBP and SLG are the mainstream statistics that measure the aforementioned skills. Any keen observer of the Red Sox is acutely aware of the fact that Nomar rarely EARNS a walk. The pitcher usually walks Nomar. He is up there to swing the bat and most times he makes contact. Fortunately, Nomar hits for a high average leading to an above average on-base percentage. Another way to put it is that a lot of Nomar’s OBP is tied up in his ability to hit for average and for most players that is a risky strategy.
The table below is in Baseball Prospectus 2004 Book in the Baltimore Orioles chapter.
Correlation for batters, per PA, consecutive seasons >200 at-bats, all players 1969-2003
K - .837
SB - .829
BB - .751
HR - .750
1B - .585
O - .583 (batting an out)
H - .450
3B - .412
2B - .384
K, SB, BB, and HR have a high correlation in consecutive seasons; thus a player’s performance in these areas from one year to the next should be similar. Three of the four (K, BB, HR) are battles between the pitcher and hitter only. The outcome is not dependent upon the eight other defensive players on the field. Luck plays a bigger role in the other outcomes. Hence, “Events that come primarily from a player’s own skill will be very highly correlated for the same player from one season to the next; events that are mostly luck will have low correlations” (Huckabay, et al). Since Nomar relies on hits (.450) as his primary weapon to getting on-base, Nomar’s OBP will likely vary from year to year and this has held true throughout his career. Half of Nomar’s value as a hitter is highly variable.
The other half, his ability to hit for power and drive in runs, is also variable. Nomar’s SLG has become less influence by home runs from 1998 as the table below illustrates (year – SLG - XBH/PA; 2B+3B/PA; HR/PA):
98 – 584 - .1227/.0690/.0537
99 – 603 - .1227/.0773/.0454
00 – 599 - .1252/.0902/.0351
02 – 528 - .1227/.0880/.0346
03 – 524 - .1085/.0695/.0389
Other than in 2003, Nomar’s HR/PA has dropped each full season while XBH/PA has stayed steady. The declining homerun rate is not a positive trend.
The more concerning development is the overall drop in slugging percentage post-wrist injury caused by, the previously discussed, drop in HR/PA and XBH/PA. Intuitively one would think that a decrease in G/F ratio would increase SLG, but the opposite is true of Nomar. Nomar had a G/F ratio greater than 1.16 from 1998-2000 or his 584+SLG years, when he hit the majority of his balls on the ground. In 2002 and 2003, Nomar’s G/F ratio dropped to .71 and .73, respectfully, but his SLG dropped as well. It seems that Nomar hit a high percentage of his fly balls with authority increasing the likelihood for XBH from 98-00 and even though Nomar hit more fly balls in 02-03, the majority was of the weaker variety resulting in outs or singles rather than XBH. A professional scout(s) after a five season at-bats review would be the best resource to comment on the above statement and be able to recognize any differences in pre and post-injury. Since both the numbers and the conclusion of the above analysis can not both be positive, the most optimist outlook is that it would be difficult to forecast Nomar’s future ability to hit for power increasing the risk of a long-term deal.
The possible 2004 winter free agent alternatives in the infield (less first baseman) are Eric Chavez, Edgar Renteria, Orlando Cabrera and Jose Vidro. (Of course, we could discuss the tons of scenarios to offset the possible loss of Nomar’s production but that would go on forever.) Chavez would be a less risky investment for numerous reasons with similar upside of Nomar, although it is unlikely that he is leaving Oakland. Chavez has hired former Red Sox post season killer, Dave Stewart as his agent and the talk is of signing a “fair” deal for both parties soon. Negotiations are ongoing; the deal will get done. Cabrera would not come close to filling the shoes of Nomar. A O.C. signing would have to be in conjunction with the inking of Vidro. Prior to last season, Vidro’s OBP was tied to his AVG like Nomar, but not to that extreme. Vidro also has not shown nearly the same amount of power as Nomar throughout his career. The same can be said of Renteria. Other than Chavez (an unlikely free agent), there is no upcoming infield free agent alternative that can fulfill Nomar’s past production making the decision an even more difficult one.
The Sox should not sign Nomar to a long-term deal this spring. There is too much risk involved. A reasonable and conservative projection for Nomar in 2005 and beyond is 285/330/480. Vidro, Renteria and Cabrera could put up that line and their upcoming salaries may not top $10 million. Paying $14 million for those numbers at shortstop is not cost effective. Thus, the Sox should wait to sign Nomar. Waiting on Nomar does run the risk of further alienating him, but only the Cubs and Anaheim have the resources to match the Sox and an opening at shortstop. The Sox can certainly top any offer made by another club. Hopefully, Nomar can regain his power of the past in 2004 and the Sox ink Nomar a week after the parade.
The reports indicated that the Red Sox and Nomar have had varying opinions on his “market value” during these changing economic times in baseball. It should no longer be much of an issue with the acquisition of A-Hole and the signing of Tejada. Baseball “market value” is based primarily on historical performance for a number of reasons. With that in mind, Nomar’s “market value” is above Tejada’s roughly $12 million salary and A-Hole’s salary paid by the MFY at $16 million. Both Nomar and the Sox appear to not have issue with the length of the proposal (three years), so a contract around $42 million should be considered “market value.” The issues are will Nomar’s future performance mirror his historical production and are better alternatives available.
Beside that fact that Nomar was an all-world hitter prior to his wrist injury, the only good comparables (shortstops in the modern era), in terms of getting a gauge for future performance is HOF, Ernie Banks. One player is too small of a sample size to draw any type of conclusions about Nomar’s future performance (I will mention that Banks did not put up an OPS+ greater than 120 after the age of 30) so a hard look at his past performance in relation to a larger sample is the best way to measure Nomar’s future value.
A hitter’s value is mostly measured by his ability to contribute to putting runs on the scoreboard by getting on-base/scoring runs and hitting for power/driving in runs. A player’s OBP and SLG are the mainstream statistics that measure the aforementioned skills. Any keen observer of the Red Sox is acutely aware of the fact that Nomar rarely EARNS a walk. The pitcher usually walks Nomar. He is up there to swing the bat and most times he makes contact. Fortunately, Nomar hits for a high average leading to an above average on-base percentage. Another way to put it is that a lot of Nomar’s OBP is tied up in his ability to hit for average and for most players that is a risky strategy.
The table below is in Baseball Prospectus 2004 Book in the Baltimore Orioles chapter.
Correlation for batters, per PA, consecutive seasons >200 at-bats, all players 1969-2003
K - .837
SB - .829
BB - .751
HR - .750
1B - .585
O - .583 (batting an out)
H - .450
3B - .412
2B - .384
K, SB, BB, and HR have a high correlation in consecutive seasons; thus a player’s performance in these areas from one year to the next should be similar. Three of the four (K, BB, HR) are battles between the pitcher and hitter only. The outcome is not dependent upon the eight other defensive players on the field. Luck plays a bigger role in the other outcomes. Hence, “Events that come primarily from a player’s own skill will be very highly correlated for the same player from one season to the next; events that are mostly luck will have low correlations” (Huckabay, et al). Since Nomar relies on hits (.450) as his primary weapon to getting on-base, Nomar’s OBP will likely vary from year to year and this has held true throughout his career. Half of Nomar’s value as a hitter is highly variable.
The other half, his ability to hit for power and drive in runs, is also variable. Nomar’s SLG has become less influence by home runs from 1998 as the table below illustrates (year – SLG - XBH/PA; 2B+3B/PA; HR/PA):
98 – 584 - .1227/.0690/.0537
99 – 603 - .1227/.0773/.0454
00 – 599 - .1252/.0902/.0351
02 – 528 - .1227/.0880/.0346
03 – 524 - .1085/.0695/.0389
Other than in 2003, Nomar’s HR/PA has dropped each full season while XBH/PA has stayed steady. The declining homerun rate is not a positive trend.
The more concerning development is the overall drop in slugging percentage post-wrist injury caused by, the previously discussed, drop in HR/PA and XBH/PA. Intuitively one would think that a decrease in G/F ratio would increase SLG, but the opposite is true of Nomar. Nomar had a G/F ratio greater than 1.16 from 1998-2000 or his 584+SLG years, when he hit the majority of his balls on the ground. In 2002 and 2003, Nomar’s G/F ratio dropped to .71 and .73, respectfully, but his SLG dropped as well. It seems that Nomar hit a high percentage of his fly balls with authority increasing the likelihood for XBH from 98-00 and even though Nomar hit more fly balls in 02-03, the majority was of the weaker variety resulting in outs or singles rather than XBH. A professional scout(s) after a five season at-bats review would be the best resource to comment on the above statement and be able to recognize any differences in pre and post-injury. Since both the numbers and the conclusion of the above analysis can not both be positive, the most optimist outlook is that it would be difficult to forecast Nomar’s future ability to hit for power increasing the risk of a long-term deal.
The possible 2004 winter free agent alternatives in the infield (less first baseman) are Eric Chavez, Edgar Renteria, Orlando Cabrera and Jose Vidro. (Of course, we could discuss the tons of scenarios to offset the possible loss of Nomar’s production but that would go on forever.) Chavez would be a less risky investment for numerous reasons with similar upside of Nomar, although it is unlikely that he is leaving Oakland. Chavez has hired former Red Sox post season killer, Dave Stewart as his agent and the talk is of signing a “fair” deal for both parties soon. Negotiations are ongoing; the deal will get done. Cabrera would not come close to filling the shoes of Nomar. A O.C. signing would have to be in conjunction with the inking of Vidro. Prior to last season, Vidro’s OBP was tied to his AVG like Nomar, but not to that extreme. Vidro also has not shown nearly the same amount of power as Nomar throughout his career. The same can be said of Renteria. Other than Chavez (an unlikely free agent), there is no upcoming infield free agent alternative that can fulfill Nomar’s past production making the decision an even more difficult one.
The Sox should not sign Nomar to a long-term deal this spring. There is too much risk involved. A reasonable and conservative projection for Nomar in 2005 and beyond is 285/330/480. Vidro, Renteria and Cabrera could put up that line and their upcoming salaries may not top $10 million. Paying $14 million for those numbers at shortstop is not cost effective. Thus, the Sox should wait to sign Nomar. Waiting on Nomar does run the risk of further alienating him, but only the Cubs and Anaheim have the resources to match the Sox and an opening at shortstop. The Sox can certainly top any offer made by another club. Hopefully, Nomar can regain his power of the past in 2004 and the Sox ink Nomar a week after the parade.
0 Old Comments:
Thank you - Red Sox!
This site is not associated with the Boston Red Sox, Major League Baseball nor Major League Players Assoication
© 2003-2010 Thomas J. Fratamico, III
All Rights Reserved
